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C
hina’s recent economic history is phenomenal. 
The Communist Party of China (CPC), by aban-
doning Marxist-Leninist dogma and adopting 
pragmatic economic policies, has lifted hundreds 
of millions of people out of abject poverty in a few short 
decades. No other government in human history has accom-
plished anything remotely comparable. Most Nobel Peace 
Prizes celebrate far slighter achievements. 
Communist China’s accomplishments should caution 
outside experts. Economics surely has more to learn from 
China than China has ever learned from economics. Much 
rhetoric from the right (“See what happens when capitalism 
is unleashed!”) and the left (“Capitalism destroyed Chinese 
equality, Mao’s greatest legacy!”) is, in our opinion, far off 
target. China has not adopted capitalism, and Mao left no 
legacy of real equality.1 
The CPC refers to its economic system as “Market Social-
ism with Chinese Characteristics.” Journalists reporting on 
China largely ignore this official phraseology, perhaps smiling 
at the Party leadership’s unwillingness to formally acknowledge 
having abandoned communism and embraced capitalism. 
Observing the formation of stock markets, giant banks and 
corporations, business schools, and financial regulators, they 
can be forgiven for jumping to conclusions. In fact, the Party 
leadership is being quite deliberate in its choice of words. 
China is a market economy. The prices of most goods and 
services are set by supply and demand. China is also socialist 
in a sense Lenin would recognize. Its government is a people’s 
democratic dictatorship of the proletariat—a people’s democ-
racy in that the government rules in the name of the whole 
people, and a dictatorship of the proletariat in that the CPC, 
ruling in the name of the proletariat, suppresses political 
dissent beyond certain boundaries using the police power of 
the state. Finally, China remains fundamentally Chinese. The 
CPC has come to resemble the meritocratic Imperial Civil 
Service that governed China in its previous eras of greatness. 
Membership in the Party is a badge of high status. Students 
with high grade point averages, successful professionals, and 
other persons of accomplishment are invited to join, and 
promotion within the Party is, to an extent at least, merit-
based. “Market Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” seems 
a much better description of all this than “capitalism.” 
In fact, China is going where no country has gone before. 
Its economic system is something largely new and outside the 
experience of Western academic economists. Foreign experts 
have nonetheless offered prescriptions that China’s leaders, in 
some cases, have followed, or perhaps swallowed. Thus, China 
has financial regulators and regulations. It has stock markets 
and banks and business corporations. Its corporations have 
boards of directors, with careful attention to the fraction that 
are designated as “independent.” Its government negotiates 
free trade agreements and adjusts the money supply and fiscal 
policy to stimulate the macroeconomy. In all of these ways, 
China looks and acts like a capitalist economy. 
But all is not as it seems. The Party continues to enunciate 
Five-Year Plans, which delineate all-embracing Party objec-
tives. Financial regulators and judges are virtually all Party 
members as well as government employees, and their careers 
are overseen by various Party organs, notably the Organization 
Department of the CPC, which ensure that cadres throughout 
China act in harmony with Party policies. Cadres’ job security, 
prospects for promotion, and ability to advance the careers 
of their underlings all depend on their own overt demonstra-
tions of harmonious cooperation with Party objectives.2 In 
general, listings on the domestic stock markets are limited 
and rationed out by bureaucrats intent upon implementing 
Party objectives.3 Chinese banks and other financial institu-
tions are essentially all state-owned enterprises of one form or 
another, and their lending policies must be consistent with 
Party objectives4—though recent CPC Third Plenum reforms 
call for established nonfinancial firms being granted banking 
licences. In addition to having CEOs and boards of directors, 
all but the least significant Chinese corporations also have 
Party Secretaries and Party Committees.5 
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organization to be above the law. Fukuyama (2010) elaborates on this, arguing that the 
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of innovation and of a risk-tolerant financial system to sustained prosperity, and La Porta et 
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8. On how cadres are selected and promoted see Deng et al. (2014), Landry (2008), 
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10. On entrenched oligarchies in Latin America and elsewhere, see e.g. Bortz and 
Haber (2002), Calomiris and Haber (2014), Edwards (2010, Galeano and Allende 
(1997), Haber, North and Weingast (2007), Haber (1989, 2002), Morck, Stangeland 
and Yeung (2000), Morck, Wolfenzohn and Yeung (2005), and Rajan and Zingales 
(2003, 2004).
Middle Income Trap, major reconfigurations of both corpo-
rate governance and country governance seem necessary. 
Latin America stands out especially as having difficul-
ties with this transition. Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela 
each sustained periods of rapid industrialization and were 
hailed as emerging First World countries, only to stagnate 
for decades as elites entrenched their economic and political 
control.10 Many countries in the Middle East and other parts 
of Asia also fit this bill. A common theme across countries is 
that the most formidable barrier to a successful transforma-
tion is the self-interest of powerful people whose wealth and 
power depend upon the continued importance of institu-
tions appropriate to catch-up growth, but inappropriate for 
continuing the ascent to sustained high-income status. China 
is now approaching the point where this sort of institutional 
transformation seems necessary, and where these opposing 
forces muster strength. 
Institutional Development 
China’s economic success is much publicized, but the abysmal 
depths from which it rose are less fully appreciated. Plumb-
ing those depths provides important insights into China’s 
current institutions.
The Fall of China
European traders found 16th century China a united empire, 
and Chinese officials found the Europeans rather unimpres-
sive, and soon confined them to a small stretch of riverbank 
in Guangzhou, where their trading missions (called “hongs”) 
conducted limited and carefully supervised transactions with 
select local merchants. As the Emperor Qian Long patiently 
explained in a letter to Britain’s King George III,
Our Celestial Empire possesses all things in prolific abundance 
and lacks no product within its own borders. There was therefore no 
need to import the manufactures of outside barbarians in exchange 
for our own produce. But as the tea, silk and porcelain which 
the Celestial Empire produces, are absolute necessities to European 
nations and to yourselves, we have permitted, as a signal mark of 
favour, that foreign hongs should be established at Guanzhou, so 
that your wants might be supplied and your country thus participate 
in our beneficence. 
The Emperor had clearly not heard of the Law of Compar-
ative Advantage, which affirms that any country gains from 
This is not to say that China’s institutional reforms are 
Potemkin Villages—artificial constructions designed to 
impress credulous foreigners. China’s reforms are real. CEOs 
and boards have real authority and make real decisions. 
Corporations’ Party Secretaries and Party Committees have 
veto power over critical decisions, but exercise it only very 
selectively to help the CEO and board avoid deviating from 
Party objectives. Moreover, the Organization Department 
of the Communist Party genuinely values competence, and 
cadres’ promotions may be genuinely merit-based—though 
loyalty, obedience, and circumspection doubtless also 
matter. 6 The CEO of a growing and profitable firm might 
be promoted to Mayor or Party Secretary of a large city, and 
the Mayor of a dynamic small city might be promoted to 
Party Secretary of an important corporation. 
How did such a system become so successful? Institutions 
widely accepted as key to rapid economic development—
sophisticated contracts, property rights, corporation, and 
securities law, a financial system that encourages innovation, 
investor rights, a powerful middle class, and even the rule of 
law—are absent or, at best, ephemeral in China.7 We propose 
here that the Party’s creation of something approaching a 
genuine meritocracy explains much of the success, and that 
the Party’s stated objectives and effective control of members’ 
careers may, in retrospect, have helped solve the coordina-
tion problems that the mid-20th century economist Paul 
Rosenstein-Rodan rightly saw as barriers to rapid economic 
development.8 
However, as we argue at the end of this paper, institu-
tions conducive to a Big Push, especially those associated 
with corporate governance, are likely to prove inappropriate 
or even dysfunctional after “catch up” growth ends. The only 
proven paths from middle- to high-income status require the 
institutions developed by existing high-income countries. 
Historically, many countries that managed short spurts of 
rapid development but then failed to adopt such institu-
tions have ended up as “always developing, never developed” 
oligarchic or “crony capitalist” economies. A hopefully untrue 
national joke proclaims that “Brazil is the economy of the 
future, and always will be.”9 Today’s large high-income econo-
mies’ institutions take different forms, but all came to relegate 
resource allocation to decentralized planning by competing 
firms that are financed by middle-class investors’ savings, 
responsive to market forces, and subject to the rule of law. 
When such a transition is necessary for China to avoid this 
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11. In fairness, the Europeans were subjected to torture and summary execution by 
often corrupt officials, letting the British justify military actions as necessary to establish 
treaty ports subject to European rule of law—with opium legalized in these, if not in 
Europe. See esp. ch. 3 in Fay (1975). 
12. For details on the prevalence of hepatitis, see Liu and Fan 2007.
13. World Development Indicators database, World Bank. 
14. We follow Chinese practice in using the term communism to describe a money-
less utopia and socialism to describe a country striving to achieve communism. We 
sharply distinguish socialism from social democracy. 
15. Hayek (1945, p. 78).
16. For more detail, see Hayek (1937, 1944)
17. These problems, formalized by Jensen and Meckling (1976), are relevant in any 
large organization (La Porta et al. 1997). 
18. On agency problems in socialist economies, see Shleifer and Vishny (1992, 
1998).
When Mao finally died in 1976, China was poorer than 
sub-Saharan Africa. Agriculture had collapsed, and tens of 
millions had died in famines. Creative thinking was politi-
cally hazardous, and vociferous loyalty trumped competence 
throughout the Party and government. Mao’s death marked 
the end of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), but left the 
economy in ruins and the people mired in poverty, illness, 
and illiteracy. In 1978, China’s per capita GDP ranked among 
the lowest in the world. Hepatitis was endemic and virtually 
all tap water was unsafe.12 In 1982, 34.5% of all adults and 
49% of female adults were illiterate.13 
From this unpromising starting point, China’s Commu-
nist reformers have lifted living standards to Latin American 
levels. In 2013, the World Bank listed China’s per capita GDP 
as roughly matching that of Peru. Peruvians are not the richest 
people in the world, but are incomparably better off than 
most Chinese in 1978, and most sub-Saharan Africans now. 
China, like Peru, is now a middle-income country and, like 
much of Latin America, confronts middle income country 
problems—inequality, oligarchs, and a historically justifiable 
mistrust of the West. 
Socialist Legal Origin
The system Mao imposed, which was based on Stalin’s Soviet 
Union, continues to influence Chinese governance. To make 
these connections clearer, we offer a brief overview of social-
ist governance.14 
According to the famous Austrian economist, Fried-
rich von Hayek, the central problem in economics is not, as 
commonly expressed in textbooks, the allocation of scarce 
resources to competing ends, but “rather a problem of how to 
secure the best use of resources known to any of the members 
of society, for ends whose relative importance only those 
individuals know. Or, to put it briefly, it is a problem of the 
utilization of knowledge not given to anyone in its totality.”15 
Hayek argued that markets efficiently gather this informa-
tion and shape incentives so that all concerned unknowingly 
coordinate their actions to minimize waste.16 Modern finance 
theory is more qualified, with its recognition that agency 
problems and other information asymmetry problems cannot 
be eradicated. Much work in corporate governance turns on 
how to manage these problems and limit their social and 
financial costs.17
Lenin devised an alternative system of governance. The 
fundamental problems in the socialist governance are also 
problems of information and incentives.18 Central planners 
need reliable information about the productive capacities 
trade. British merchants sought more trade and soon made 
the Chinese “offers they could not refuse”: they peddled 
opium. As opium addiction spread, the Emperor Dao Guang 
launched a War on Drugs. His Drugs Czar, Commissioner 
Lin Ze-xu, confiscated and burned the Hong’s opium stores 
in 1839. Remarkably, the British opium dealers convinced 
Parliament to respond with gunboats, which quickly 
overcame China’s technologically antiquated defences.11 
Further Chinese attempts to ban opium provoked the Second 
Opium War in 1857, and a more devastating military defeat. 
Both Opium Wars left China owing huge indemnities that 
drained government coffers of silver, and the second opened 
the country to Christianity as well as opium. The Tai Ping 
rebellion, led by Hong Xiuquan, the self-proclaimed Little 
Brother of Jesus, was roughly contemporaneous with the 
Second Opium War, and its costly suppression further 
drained the treasury and devastated the land. 
By the turn of the 20th century, China was a failed state, 
its imperial government still largely contemptuous of foreign 
technology and its people afloat on opium. Counterfactuals in 
history are scarcely objective, but we wonder what would have 
happened had the Celestial Empire instead traded tea, silk, 
and porcelain for European technology, as Meiji Japan did 
after 1868? Might foreign knowledge have followed foreign 
trade, as in Japan? Might the Fall of China have been less 
crippling, or even entirely avoided? 
In fairness, factions within the Qing court pressed for 
the importation of foreign technology and ideas, but without 
real success. The imperial court was rife with corruption, 
factional politics, and incompetent officials in inherited senior 
positions. The moribund dynasty collapsed in 1912 with the 
foundation of the Republic of China. Power evaded Sun 
Yat-sen’s Nationalist Party as the warlord Yuan Shikai sought 
to found a new imperial dynasty. The ensuing conflicts left 
China a patchwork of warring fiefdoms. By the 1920s, China 
was “merely a geographical expression,” and appears on maps 
of the era as a multi-colour mosaic of states. The Nationalist 
Party, now led by Chiang Kai-Shek, and the Communist 
Party, led by Mao Zedong, soon emerged as the two major 
contenders in a full-fledged civil war.
By the 1930s, China was so economically and politically 
enfeebled that Japan’s military zealots perceived it ripe for 
conquest. Having seized Manchuria in 1932, Japan invaded 
China-proper in 1937. After Japan’s World War II defeat, the 
civil war resumed. The Communist victory in 1949 left Mao 
free to implement, in succession, forced agricultural collectiv-
ization, the Great Leap Forward, and the Cultural Revolution. 
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19. On Soviet governance, see Smith (1984); on the Soviet money and banking sys-
tem, see Nakamura (2012). On the era of central panning in China, see Chow (2011).
20. See Piotrosky and Wong (2012) for details regarding seeming deficiencies in 
Chinese accounting practices. 
21. See Gordon and Wei (2012) on barriers to the development of tax-financed gov-
ernment in post-1978 China.
22. See Shoresman (1998) on the history of academic salaries in China.
23. On the soft budget constraint in socialist economies, see Kornai (1986). 
24. On the ubiquity of shortages and paucity of surpluses under socialism, see Shle-
ifer and Vishny (1992). 
25. See Lü (2000). 
were paid minimal salaries; for example, in 1988 university 
professors in China averaged RMB211 per month (US$43 
at the official exchange rate).22 However, workers’ production 
units provided (very) basic housing, food, health care, and 
children’s schooling. Wages were only for buying luxuries, 
such as bicycles or extra shoes. Salaries, living conditions, 
and food rations were generally unrelated to effort. Rather, 
continual exhortations about loyalty and duty to the Party 
and proletariat were used to motivate effort. 
This system has obvious design flaws. First, disconnecting 
individual effort from individual rewards creates free-rider 
problems. Workers, paid the same for working or not working, 
understandably find the latter more pleasant; and agricultural 
and industrial productivity accordingly collapsed by the late 
1950s. Second, managers, controlling only funds designated 
to pay for inputs, understandably exaggerated their input 
needs. The resulting soft budget constraint problem—that 
is, the ever-increasing costs of production that managers 
reported so as to expand the resources under their control—
quickly became a major governance problem in China, as in 
other socialist economies.23 
Managers’ objectives were specified as quantitative 
production targets, so rational managers sacrificed quality 
for quantity. Consumers coped by avoiding goods made near 
the end of a quota period, when quality control was worst, 
as factories raced to meet their quotas. Factory managers, 
granted control rights without corresponding cash flow rights, 
understandably maximized their private benefits. Managers 
could extract favors, if not outright bribes, for providing 
goods—especially goods of verifiably high quality—that 
were in short supply. Quite predictably, virtually everything 
was always in short supply, even though simple planning 
errors would presumably have led to shortages and surpluses 
in roughly equal proportion. A shadow free-market economy 
thus arose to allocate the goods and services people actually 
wanted, needed, and could afford in one way or another.24 
This legacy of gray-market transactions, in which favor-
trading (guanxi) was widely socially accepted as necessary 
for simply getting by, persists in modern Chinese business 
ethics.25 
The predictability of input costs and output levels attained 
primary importance under this system of governance. Central 
planners wanted their plans to be attainable, and managers 
wanted their cost and output mandates to include a predict-
able (and, if possible, ever larger) wedge between revenues 
and real costs to fund their private benefits. In the Soviet 
system, innovation was avoided because it made costs and 
and needs of people and enterprises throughout a large and 
diverse country. Given that information, planners can formu-
late input and production plans, whose implementation must 
then be entrusted to potentially self-interested agents. Much 
of the surveillance apparatus in the Soviet Union was initially 
justified as providing central planners with the information 
they needed both to allocate resources and to ensure that 
factory managers, workers, railroad employees, and others 
acted as faithful agents. Many did not, of course, and self-
interested behavior such as selling inputs and outputs on the 
black market became widespread. To control such agency 
problems, the Soviet leadership devoted ever increasing 
resources to surveillance and came to regard market transac-
tions as treasonous sabotage worthy of the death penalty. 
China adopted this system in stages in the 1950s, and all but 
eliminated private enterprise in these years. 
The essence of socialist governance can thus be summa-
rized succinctly as follows.19 Every part of the economy 
must be saturated with Party cadres who feed information 
upwards through successively higher-level tiers of cadres and, 
ultimately, to the central planners. The central planners issue 
production quotas to the managers of factories, railroads, 
army bases, and other operational units. In the Cold War era 
Soviet system, each unit had a cash account at a state bank, 
into which the central planners deposited funds the unit 
could draw upon to pay its workers and to acquire inputs. 
Productive operations, such as collective farms or factories, 
each had a second non-cash account with the state bank, in 
which their sales revenues accumulated. The unit could not 
transfer funds from one account to the other. Only the central 
planners could do this, and only in accordance with the 
central plan. The government and Party funded themselves 
with the difference between what accumulated in non-cash 
accounts and what was transferred to cash accounts. There 
were no taxes. 
This deep integration of public finances with central 
planning was, and perhaps still is, a key obstacle to more 
complete reform. Complete privatization threatens govern-
ment revenues, for accounting standards are problematic,20 
the Chinese citizenry are unaccustomed to paying taxes 
and Chinese governments at all levels are unaccustomed 
to collecting them efficiently. However, the government is 
working towards developing a comprehensive income taxation 
system,21 and recent reforms are laying the groundwork for 
a property tax. Nevertheless tax collection from businesses 
remains challenging.
Under socialist governance, workers and managers 
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26. On the dearth of innovation under Soviet socialism, see Berliner (1978).
27. ON the Cultural Revolution, see e.g. Feng (2007).
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and Willer et al. (2009) for discussion of the Cultural Revolution in China in this context. 
29. On the ethical legacy of communism, see e.g. Holmes (1993), Rose et al. 
(1998).
30. Key episodes included attempts to seize power by Lin Biao and the Gang of Four 
and a history of Rightists versus Leftists tensions within the CPC, see Baum (1996). 
20th century ideology: the social value of great men who, 
by transcending conventional ethical standards, lift society 
through great leaps of faith. Mao’s faith was a deep belief 
in the ultimate goal of Communism, a moneyless economic 
utopia in which altruistic citizens would voluntarily work 
hard for the common good and the state would fade away 
completely. 
This paradise was, of course, attainable only via the 
Socialist path charted by Stalin. Precisely what that path 
entailed came to be disputed. The Rightist faction sought 
to reengineer economic institutions; Mao’s Leftist faction 
sought to reengineer human nature. The rightists were social 
engineers with technocratic mind sets, the leftists were 
romantics with literary ideals. 
Realizing that reality was not conforming to his 
plans, Mao’s solution was to intensify social pressure. In 
the 1950s, his Great Leap Forward sought to industrialize 
China overnight by mobilizing all peasants to deforest vast 
landscapes to make charcoal to slag mounds of household 
metal goods in village iron foundries. China boosted its iron 
production, albeit of such abysmal quality as to be economi-
cally worthless, even as tens of millions perished in famines 
amid unattended fields and man-made dust storms in a China 
no less industrially backward. In the wake of this disaster, 
Rightists gained influence, and the CPC grew increasingly 
technocratic. 
Appalled by this, Mao organized the Cultural Revolution 
in the late 1960s by bestowing ethical and social status on 
any who arose to purge the Party of its technocratic elitists. 
Mobs destroyed ancient temples, the university system, and a 
generation of Chinese intellectuals. This chaos and hard-line 
Leftists’ relentless attempts to grab power as Mao’s health 
declined sank China into deeper poverty.30 Deng Xiaoping’s 
Rightist “reformers” took charge of the CPC in 1978 after 
a thorough purge of prominent Leftists. Critically, Deng’s 
Rightists were neither democrats nor free market liberals. 
Rather, they sought a pragmatic and scientifically engineered 
Socialism, free of romanticized idealism. After the errors 
and excesses of romantic communism, China was ripe for a 
pragmatic economic approach. 
Deng’s first major reform reintroduced market incentives 
in agriculture: peasants could sell excess produce in farmer’s 
markets. The result, an abrupt reappearance of plentiful fruit 
and vegetables, encouraged further reforms. By the 1990s, 
only a few key prices remained under state control. China 
had become a market economy in the sense that, for the most 
part, prices were set by supply and demand. 
With socialism collapsing across Eastern Europe in 1989, 
and then in the Soviet Union in 1992, pragmatism neces-
output levels unpredictable and risked increasing supply—
both major potential problems for planners and factory or 
collective farm managers alike.26 The situation in China was, 
if anything, worse: prior to 1978, innovators risked being 
branded as counterrevolutionary, made social outcasts, 
and sometimes even banished to remote collective farms or 
re-education camps.27 The authors’ visits to Chinese factories 
in the 1980s were thus something of a journey into indus-
trial history. Coal-fired railroad locomotives, as in American 
Western films, were still in production, and textile mills still 
used machinery that was in place on Liberation Day in 1949. 
This premium on stability surely made socialist governance 
simpler for both planners and managers, but left China with 
antiquated and inefficient technologies that locked in low 
productivity. 
While China’s managers and political leaders clearly 
understand the costs of laggard technologies, the political 
leadership, especially, retain an overarching acceptance of 
stability as a social goal—seemingly without realizing the 
inherent contradictions in this. Technological progress neces-
sitates accepting a substantial instability about which firms 
survive and prosper, which professions pay well or poorly, 
and which sectors of the economy expand or shrink, but this 
microeconomic instability stabilizes overall prosperity. Unfor-
tunately, technological stagnation, like pervasive shortages, 
abysmal quality control, low productivity and high costs, 
became the new normal. Altering mind sets accustomed to 
this world became a major challenge to reformers. 
Given these governance problems, the Chinese economy 
stagnated. In the Great Leap Forward of the late 1950s, 
and again in the Cultural Revolution of the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, Mao sought to reinvigorate China by equating 
self-interest with criminality and even treason, and by encour-
aging people to seek social status by denouncing economic 
traitors.28 Both episodes merely brought deeper economic 
collapse and a general acceptance that being an economic 
criminal was not really a bad thing. Indeed, defying, circum-
venting, or otherwise cheating a system that many privately 
regarded as evil and oppressive came to be seen as morally 
laudable.29 We suspect that this entirely understandable 
ethical inversion—good people defy bad rules—remains an 
important element of modern China. 
Maoist Catharsis and the Resurrection of China 
Following Mao’s death in 1976, reformers led by Deng Xiaop-
ing took charge. Deng’s faction of the Communist Party of 
China was a technocratic (Rightist) element that had long 
vied with Mao’s idealistic (Leftist) faction. Mao, a one-time 
poet enamoured of philosophy, embraced a popular early 
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31. See Blanchard et al. (1993) for a comparative analysis of the deconstruction of 
socialism in Eastern Europe and Åslund (2001) regarding the former member republics 
of the Soviet Union. See also Åslund (2007). 
32. See Allen et al (2012) and Allen and Shin (2012). 
33. See Guo (2012) on the Leading Role of the CPC in the Chinese constitution. An 
English translation of the constitution is at english.people.com.cn/constitution. 
34. For more detail on CPC and state organs’ oversight of CEO pay in China, see 
Landry (2008) and McGreggor (2010). For pay-performance sensitivity in China, see 
Firth et al. (2006). 
35. This information is from the websites, of Lenovo, Legend Holding Company, and 
Oceanwide Group. 
These reforms combine to give China the appearance of 
a free market economy, with institutions recognizably similar 
to those found in the Western world in general, and in the 
area of governance, especially, in the United States.32 Appear-
ances can be deceiving. Corporate governance, like all laws 
and regulations in China, must be interpreted through a key 
provision in the Constitution of the People’s Republic of 
China that enshrines a “Leading Role” for the Communist 
Party.33 
As an example of how this works, consider CEO pay.34 
CEO pay in China superficially resembles that in the United 
States. The CEOs of SOEs earn bonuses tied to account-
ing earnings and, for some listed state-owned enterprises, 
stock returns. But only parts of these bonuses are disbursed 
immediately. Substantial fractions of CEOs’ bonuses 
accumulate in funds and are disbursed every few years after 
the CEO’s performance is reviewed by the Organization 
Department of the Communist Party. Thus, SOE CEO pay 
is linked to both financial performance and Party loyalty. The 
latter is arguably the more important, for the Organization 
Department also determines which CEOs keep their jobs, 
gain promotions to more prestigious positions in the corpo-
rate world, government, and Party, or end up demoted or even 
more severely punished. This system of corporate governance 
is deemed essential, for without it the Party could not exercise 
its Leading Role. 
As a second example, consider statistics that show 
the expanding role of private sector firms in China, often 
highlighted in journalistic accounts of China’s economic 
rise. A degree of sleight of hand is at work here, for Chinese 
official statistics count as “private sector” any firm in which 
the state does not hold a direct control block of shares. Thus, 
any controlled subsidiary of an SOE is deemed to be a private 
sector firm, as are any firms owned directly by government or 
Party officials, or by state-controlled agencies. Lenovo is thus 
a private sector firm, even though it has a dominant owner, 
Legend Holding Company (with a 32.44% equity block in 
2013), whose major shareholders are the Chinese Academy of 
Science, the Lenovo Employees Fund, and China Oceanwide 
Holdings Group (each with at least a 20% stake in 2013, 
the last controlled by Lu Zhiqiang (a prominent member 
of CPPCC Standing Committee).35 A skeptical interpreta-
tion of these statistics is that they represent a façade of free 
markets; a more generous interpretation is that they reflect 
“baby steps” along a Polish path to full privatization, perhaps 
with the Chinese Academy of Science serving as a nascent 
institutional investor. Yet here, too, Chinese reluctance to 
sitated further reforms. But the suppression of the Tien An 
Men Square protests vividly demonstrated that multi-party 
democracy was not on this list. However, many of the post-
socialist governance reforms implemented across Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union were on the list. Inher-
iting essentially the same system of socialist central planning, 
the former Warsaw Pact countries, and then the Baltic states 
all ultimately adopted broadly similar sequential reforms. 
China, with reservations, followed along.
A major task reformers faced was the mass privatization of 
the means of production. The first step towards this goal was 
corporatization. Land, plant, and equipment, previously all 
the property of the state, had to be allocated to newly desig-
nated state-owned enterprises. This was an epic accounting 
challenge, for where one state-owned enterprise ended and 
another began had to be established. This done, the various 
post-socialist economies adopted different actual privatization 
strategies. The Czech Republic and Russia allocated vouchers 
to their citizens, and then conducted voucher-denominated 
initial public offerings. Poland established a coterie of insti-
tutional investors, assigned these shares in all privatized large 
firms, and tasked them with paying pensions and insurance 
claims. Hungary sought foreign buyers for its privatized firms.
 In hindsight, the Polish approach attracted the least criti-
cism.31 Voucher privatizations invited corruption: handfuls of 
Party insiders built business empires by buying vouchers from 
suspicious populations that preferred cash in hand to shares 
of uncertain worth. Foreign buyers provoked troublesome 
nationalist reactions. 
China’s approach was to go slow. State-owned enter-
prises were corporatized, but not thereafter immediately 
privatized. Rather, China’s leaders sought to do as much 
reform as possible while pausing at this intermediate step. 
State-owned enterprises have learned to contend with balance 
sheets and earnings statements for many years, as succes-
sive reforms gradually increased their economic autonomy. 
State-owned enterprises came to have chief executive officers, 
boards of directors, and levels of middle managers. They 
now pay for inputs (including labor), sell outputs at market 
prices, and keep the profits or disburse them as dividends. 
Many state-owned enterprises have listed their shares, or the 
shares of a controlled subsidiary, on one of China’s two stock 
markets, in Hong Kong, or even overseas in the United States 
and elsewhere. A securities regulator oversees the domestic 
markets and vets initial public offerings. These reforms have 
created a new cast of more or less private sector firms, which 
have brought a new dynamism. 
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securities, bankruptcy, property and tort laws and regula-
tions. On its face, the Chinese legal system appears to be 
rapidly conforming to international best practice. However, 
the Constitution, in granting the Party its Leading Role, and 
these judiciary processes, in placing the Legal Committee of 
the Communist Party above the Law, thus leave all laws and 
regulations subservient to Party objectives. If Party policy 
conflicts with a law or regulation, wise judges give primacy 
to Party policy. To do otherwise would be unconstitutional.38 
 
Corporate Governance and The Big Push 
That this system lifted hundreds of millions out of poverty 
and into the ranks of the global middle class is not necessarily 
an insult to free market economics. First, very rapid growth 
from the abysmal nadir of 1978 is, in part, surely the mere 
reversal of the worst of Mao’s disastrous economic policies. 
Restoring basic market incentives, importing foreign tech-
nology, reallocating labor to more productive activities, and 
holding down the yuan to spur exports to a stable and pros-
perous West were all simple measures along these lines. But 
China’s success increasingly appears to be far more than this, 
and so requires a deeper explanation. 
The Chinese system’s hidden virtues emerge when 
interpreted through the work of the mid-20th century devel-
opment economist Paul Rosenstein-Rodan.39 The influence 
of Rosenstein-Rodan, who designed the World Bank and 
trained countless students and disciples to serve as prominent 
government officials in developing economies throughout the 
world, is hard to overstate. 
Coordination Failure as a Fundamental Obstacle to 
Development
Rosenstein-Rodan saw coordination failure as the primary 
obstacle to the industrialization of a low-income, predom-
inantly agricultural economy. Thus, a lone steel mill on the 
African savannah is apt to be a commercial failure because 
its production cannot be coordinated with the activities of 
networks of suppliers and customers. Just as an organism 
cannot survive without an ecosystem, a firm cannot survive 
without an economy.40 
This perspective recognizes a high-income free market 
economy as a complex dynamic system in which each actor 
implicitly depends on the predictable actions of countless 
others. For example, a steel mill depends on the existence of coal 
mines, iron ore mines, and transportation companies as well as 
a wide range of buyers of steel—machine tools manufacturers, 
construction companies, shipbuilders, and the like. Moreover, 
the steel mill depends on there being enough of each of these 
pursue full privatization preserves the Party’s constitutionally 
mandated Leading Role. 
As yet a third example, consider the freedom of action 
of CEOs and boards of directors at both SOEs and private-
sector firms. In principle, the CEO is duty-bound to run the 
corporation efficiently and boards are empowered to ensure 
that CEOs do their duty. In practice, every SOE and all but 
the smallest private-sector firms also each have a Commu-
nist Party Secretary and a Communist Party Committee. 
At present, any enterprise employing four Party members 
or more can have imposed upon it a Party Secretary and 
Party Committee if the Party deems this useful.36 The Party 
Secretary and Party Committee do not intervene in normal 
business practices, much as the Business Judgement Rule in 
the United States denies the country’s judges the power to 
meddle in day-to-day corporate decision-making. However, 
the Party Secretary and Party Committee do serve the Party 
by keeping higher-level cadres up to date about the corpora-
tion’s activities, and by intervening as necessary to help the 
CEO and board avoid erroneously making decisions that are 
inconsistent with Party objectives. This is, of course, necessary 
to render Chinese corporate governance institutions consis-
tent with the Party’s constitutionally enshrined Leading Role. 
New firms must live within this system. Thus, the 2014 
IPO of the Chinese internet firm Alibaba was heralded as the 
largest ever floated in the U.S. Fewer accounts stressed that the 
public float was only 15% of the firm, and that a constituency-
based shareholder voting system guaranteed Lakeside Partners 
control of the board. Lakeside’s partners includes Alibaba’s 
founder Jack Ma as well as its chief risk officer and Communist 
Party Secretary, Shao Xiaofeng, a former senior police officer. 37 
The country’s judicial system raises yet other issues. 
China’s judges are government employees, paid by local or 
central governments but nominated by the matching level 
of “People’s Congress,” further screened by the matching 
Organization Departments of the Communist Party and 
finally approved by the Standing Committee at the match-
ing level of the Communist Party. Critically, judges are 
responsible to the Party first and foremost. China adopted 
a civil code legal system; so judges’ decisions are based on 
selected application of legal codes. Often, there is guidance in 
these application decisions by committees inside the People’s 
Congress and the Party’s Political and Legal Committee has 
the power to intervene in deliberations, and even to overturn 
verdicts issued by judges. Most judges are Party members and 
making decisions that contradict Party policies and guidance 
leads to Party disciplinary actions. China has accumulated 
large bodies of generally American-inspired corporations, 
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tively raise economy wide demand and thus sales. Also, every 
firm depends on sufficient competition to generate competi-
tive prices in countless markets throughout the economy, 
which in turn reduces production costs collectively. Finally, 
every firm also depends on a range of public goods that only 
the state can provide. Yet private investors and bankers are 
understandably reluctant to commit capital to ventures in 
proportion to the benefits they provide distant third parties. 
Because of these problems, Rosenstein-Rodan concludes 
that 
Existing institutions of international investment (floating of 
shares and loans) are inappropriate to the task of industrialisa-
tion of a whole area. They deal with too small units, and do not 
take advantage of external economies. Capital mostly goes to 
individual enterprises. There has never been a scheme of planned 
industrialisation comprising a simultaneous planning of several 
complementary industries.45
He therefore calls for Big Push development: the 
government funded and coordinated development of entire 
economies as the only viable way of internalizing all such 
externality problems. 
As we explain below, one interpretation of China’s 
economic rise is that the CPC is successfully funding and 
coordinating a Big Push of precisely the sort Rosenstein-
Rodan prescribed. To be sure, this interpretation is marred 
by widespread criticism of Big Push development plans as rife 
with government failure, breeding grounds for corruption 
and, historically, tragic economic stagnation.46 
Keeping up with the Neighbors 
Although Rosenstein-Rodan is quite plausibly right about coor-
dination failure as a barrier to development, he is almost surely 
wrong about the limitations of financial systems, and therefore 
about the need for government to play a leading role. Many 
rapidly developing economies feature huge business groups 
with many member firms in many different industries, their 
governance all coordinated by a single ultimate controlling 
shareholder—usually a prominent business family. Such busi-
ness groups (called zaibatsu) in late Meiji Japan can be seen 
as having orchestrated a “private-sector Big Push”—or, more 
precisely, a race between competing Big Push efforts, each 
undertaken by a zaibatsu led by a different tycoon or busi-
ness family.47 And in recent work, we argue that similarly large 
industrially diversified business groups arose in other developing 
economies, and in the histories of many developed economies, 
to effect similar episodes of rapid industrialization.48 
to prevent its being “held up”—that is, squeezed by monopo-
lists or monopsonists occupying any point along the chain. 
Each firm in the chain, in turn, depends on countless other 
firms along its supply chains, and all the other firms along all of 
their supply chains, and so on.41 And all of these firms depend 
on enough other firms paying middle income salaries to vast 
numbers of employees, who double as consumers in final goods 
markets.42 While openness lets foreign market participants fill 
some network gaps in the development of a small economy,43 
China is no longer a small economy.
Anticipating the first mover problem in game theory, 
Rosenstein-Rodan recognized that no firm would step forth 
alone to launch the industrialization of an otherwise predomi-
nantly pre-industrial economy, but that a multitude of firms 
doing so simultaneously could all render each other viable. 
To transcend the first mover problem, he therefore called for 
a “Big Push” wherein the state would coordinate the simul-
taneous industrialization of multiple firms in all sectors of 
the economy. This, he argued, could transition the entire 
economy en masse from its low-level equilibrium, in which 
individual self-interest prevents economic development, to a 
high-level equilibrium, in which every firm is sustained by 
the existence of all the others. 
Of course, public investments such as roads, bridges, 
schools, and hospitals are also unlikely to find adequate 
private-sector backing, and the government of a low-income 
agricultural economy may lack the tax base to fund socially 
optimal provision of these and other public goods on which 
every firm also depends. However, if the economy can transi-
tion to the high-level equilibrium, a huge network of firms, 
along with their employees, become available to tax, enabling 
the government to fund the schools, roads, and all the other 
public goods on which all firms also rely. The government’s 
problem of economic development is thus one of coordinating 
the transition from a very stable low-level equilibrium to this 
self-sustaining high-level equilibrium.44
Rosenstein-Rodan highlights three particularly impor-
tant characteristics of the low-level equilibrium that keep 
it highly stable. First, the financial system, accustomed to 
providing capital to specific firms for specific purposes, is not 
up to capitalizing simultaneously an economy-wide network 
of firms. Second, the financial system is not up to the task of 
coordinating the establishment and growth of firms in such 
a network so that, for example, steel mills, cement plants, 
and construction firms able to use steel and concrete all 
come online in synch. Third, the financial system cannot 
fund externalities. Every firm is, by its simple existence, a 
positive externality for every other firm because they collec-
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then sold them (at a loss) to private buyers. However, after 
contributing government money, the government planners 
exited rapidly in the 1880s. 
Japan’s post-World War II reconstruction and ascent to very 
high-income status did occur amid substantial government 
intervention and bank influence over corporate governance. 
However, a substantial revisionist literature now argues that 
the scope of state intervention in post-war Japan was vastly 
exaggerated by foreign experts looking for a case of a successful 
state-run industrial policy. Data subsequently made available 
show that the sectors that received the largest government subsi-
dies developed the most slowly, and that government planners 
succeeded mainly in targeting loser firms.50 
In sum, Japan’s initial 1870s state-led Big Push was a 
failure. The country caught up with parts of Europe by the 
1920s with its economy largely guided by its zaibatsu. Japan 
rebuilt itself after World War II, after the American military 
government dismantled the zaibatsu and left an economy of 
largely independently governed firms, which lifted it over the 
final step to sustained high-income status in the mid-20th 
century.
The Case of Korea: Another Private-sector Big Push 
Success. In the 1950s, South Korea was poorer than any 
country in sub-Saharan Africa, and far poorer than North 
Korea; by the late 1990s, its standard of living rivalled many 
countries in southern Europe. South Korea’s era of very rapid 
development was from the 1970s through the 1990s. During 
this era, the economy was dominated by large full-set diversi-
fied business groups called chaebol. 
The chaebol appear to have played a similar coordination 
role to that of the zaibatsu in late 19th- and early 20th-century 
Japan.51 The Korean government intervened extensively in the 
economy in the 1950s and the country exhibited little real 
economic growth. In the 1960s and 1970s, state interven-
tion became intensely focused on relatively narrow priorities: 
first export promotion to generate foreign currency for arms 
purchases in the 1960s; then subsidies to an even narrower 
set of heavy and chemicals industries viewed as militarily 
important in the 1970s. After a major financial crisis in 
1979, the government adopted overtly free-market policies 
and state intervention largely ceased, except for the sorts of 
R&D tax credits and other implicit subsidies found in most 
high-income country tax codes. 
Thus, decade by decade, Korean business groups were 
increasingly left to their own devices, though their too-big-
to-fail status and political influence arguably cut their costs 
of capital and helped them ride out a series of financial crises 
in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s better than could smaller 
independent firms. 
The Case of Japan: A Failed Public-sector Big Push 
Followed by a Private-sector Success. A brief history of 
Japan’s Big Push can help illuminate the current state of 
China’s economy.49 In the mid-19th century, a series of 
uninvited visits by American steam powered gunboats 
with state-of-the-art weapons revealed how humiliatingly 
backward Japan was. The Tokugawa shogun, who under-
standably yielded to U.S. demands to open trade, was 
promptly overthrown by samurai warriors outraged at his 
cowardice. Their new regime, dubbed the Meiji Restoration 
to honour the figurehead Meiji Emperor, soon understood 
why the shogun capitulated to the barbarians. Chagrined, the 
Meiji leadership resolved to acquire foreign technologies so as 
to rid Japan of foreigners. Japanese students, sent abroad in 
large numbers, returned with knowledge of how far behind 
Japan truly was. 
The Meiji leaders’ first development strategy, implemented 
in the 1870s, was to establish several dozen state-owned enter-
prises, one in each modern industry, run by foreign-educated 
Japanese or hired foreign experts. The state-owned enterprises 
proved increasingly ravenous for subsidies, and Japan experi-
enced near simultaneous financial, currency, and sovereign 
debt crises. Classical Liberal reformers took charge, organized 
the world’s first mass privatization, and implemented laissez-
faire economics. Japan’s government remained overtly 
non-interventionist until the military takeover in the 1930s. 
The former state-owned enterprises ended up owned 
by prominent merchant families, such as the Mitsui and 
Sumitomo, and a handful of upstart entrepreneurs. From the 
1880s through the 1920s, the leading business families and 
upstarts used first earnings from their existing firms and then 
public share issues to capitalize new firms in new industries. 
By the turn of the 20th century, the largest business groups—
Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Nissan, and Sumitomo—achieved “full 
set diversification”—that is, each zaibatsu had one, and rarely 
more than one, member firm in every significant industry in 
the economy. Japan developed rapidly in these decades, with 
little input from the government and little bank financing; 
and by the 1920s, it was pulling alongside parts of Europe in 
terms of industrial output and living standards. 
Full set diversification quite plausibly reflects each group’s 
controlling tycoon or business family coping with the interde-
pendencies and externalities that Rosenstein-Rodan outlines 
by coordinating the organization and growth of numerous 
firms, each in a different sector. Moreover, Japan’s ascent 
to high-income status occurred after the state withdrew its 
guiding hand. Japan’s ultimately successful industrialization 
was initially partly state-subsidized, in that the government 
established a stable of modern state-owned enterprises and 
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Although the Korean chaebol were legally proscribed from 
controlling banks, most controlled non-bank financial insti-
tutions. Both the zaibatsu and chaebol made extensive use of 
related-party transactions to channel subsidies from profitable 
member firms to member firms needing capital. Such transac-
tions are generally regarded as a mechanism for accumulating 
wealth in the pockets of the controlling shareholder, but the 
rapid and broad economic development of both countries 
raises a more benign possibility. Perhaps tunneling between 
group firms approximated the cross-industry subsidies that 
Rosenstein-Rodan’s Big Push planners would have used to 
start new firms in new industries and sustain them as other 
parts of the economic network came online. 
Japanese and Korean financial history thus motivates our 
contention that Rosenstein-Rodan and his modern follow-
ers might be right about the problem, but wrong about its 
solution. 55 Lone steel mills on the African savannah are 
indeed financially unviable without the vast ecosystem of 
firms and markets that constitutes a modern economy. But 
state planners, operating without profit incentives, were not a 
viable solution either. Rather, private sector business groups, 
run by controlling shareholders both willing and able to 
approximate maximizing the profits of their entire collec-
tion of firms, appear to work. Indeed, a large business group 
containing many firms in diverse industries, all under the 
common control of a single tycoon, is precisely the private 
sector “scheme of planned industrialisation comprising a 
simultaneous planning of several complementary industries” 
whose possibility Rosenstein-Rodan explicitly denies. 
Of course, how the business group is governed matters. 
Studies show business groups can be effective mechanisms 
for working around absent or dysfunctional institutions in 
low-income economies.56 These abilities also make them good 
mechanisms for private-sector cross-industry coordination of 
the sort needed in a Big Push.57 However, all such advantages 
for large business groups evaporate once a modern economy 
is fully in place, and being able to coordinate multiple firms 
in diverse industries ceases being socially useful. 
We postulate that the middle-income trap mentioned 
earlier occurs when business groups lobby to limit institu-
tional development so as to retain their competitive advantage 
over other forms of business organization. Once Big Push 
development nears completion, large business groups, run by 
highly connected senior tycoons or their heirs, can remain 
profitable by maximizing political rents extracted from the 
state, monopoly rents extracted from consumers, and even 
Rosenstein-Rodan envisioned government planners 
scientifically plotting out and implementing the coordinated 
development plan he deemed necessary for a Big Push. But the 
cross-country coordination achieved by Korean business groups 
is recent enough that we can ask them why they did what they 
did. Koo Cha-Kyung, chair of the apex firm in Korea’s LG 
chaebol, recounts the economic network gaps and market forces 
that forced the group’s coordinated cross-industry expansion: 
My father and I started a cosmetic cream factory in the late 
1940s. At the time, no company could supply us with plastic caps 
of adequate quality for cream jars, so we had to start a plastics 
business. Plastic caps alone were not sufficient to run the plastic 
molding plant, so we added combs, toothbrushes, and soap boxes. 
This plastic business also led us to manufacture electric fan blades 
and telephone cases, which in turn led us to manufacture electri-
cal and electronic products and telecommunications equipment. 
The plastics business also took us into oil refining, which needed 
a tanker shipping company. The oil refining company alone was 
paying an insurance premium amounting to more than half the 
total revenue of the largest insurance company in Korea. Thus, an 
insurance company was started. This natural step-by-step evolu-
tion through related businesses resulted in the Lucky-Goldstar 
(LG) group as we see it today.52
Note that there is no discussion of an overarching central 
plan formulated by central economic planners. Rather, each 
capitalization of a new affiliated firm in a new industry was 
necessitated by the needs of existing firms, and each such 
cross-industry expansion created new pressures that led to 
the capitalization of yet more new firms. The controlling 
shareholder, of course, needed the foresight to recognize these 
needs and the capital to act on each. 
Like the major Japanese zaibatsu, the largest Korean 
chaebol—Samsung, LG, Hyundai, and Daiwoo—achieved 
full set diversification: each group had one member firm in 
every major industry. Also like the Japanese zaibatsu, all 
the firms in each chaebol group were controlled by a single 
business family by means of a pyramidal structure of listed 
firms controlling other listed firms.53 In both cases, financ-
ing for new firms was predominantly from share issues; bank 
loans played little role in financing new group firms. The 
Japanese zaibatsu did contain banks as member firms, but 
the successful groups used risk-tolerant minority equity issues 
to public shareholders plus retained earnings from existing 
firms to fund start-ups.54 
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Arguably, the Organization Department of the CPC, as 
directed by top CPC cadres, has at least as much influence 
over CEOs and other top managers of centrally controlled 
SOEs as their boards have, and may well matter far more. A 
similar arrangement exists between local level Organization 
Departments and locally controlled SOEs. The Organization 
Departments of the CPC tracks the careers of all Party cadres, 
and maintaining one’s Party membership in good standing is 
essential to the career of a prospective CEO.61 
Cadres’ scope for promotions is broad, and not limited to 
the corporation or even the business sector.62 The Organization 
Department of the CPC might elevate a successful SOE CEO 
to an important Party or government position, or even to an 
important position in a private firm. Less obviously successful 
cadres might be moved sideways or demoted. For example, 
in a series of 2011 Organization Department decisions, the 
Organization Department of the CPC promoted China Petro-
leum and Chemical Corp (SINOPEC) chair Su Shulin to 
Party Secretary for Fujian province; replaced Su at SINOPEC 
with China National Offshore Oil Corp (CNOOC) chair Fu 
Chengyu; and replaced Fu at CNOOC with China National 
Petroleum Corp (CNPC) CEO Wang Yilin. Somewhat to the 
bewilderment of foreign business partners, the Organization 
Department had rotated the tires of China’s oil industry. As a 
testament to the Organization Department’s importance, the 
firms’ independent directors learned of these changes from 
the media. 63 
The practical considerations affecting a Chinese corpo-
rate manager’s career advancement thus differ starkly from 
those in the U.S. Exactly how these differences play out is 
largely unexplored. Such wide-ranging careers plausibly 
broaden cadres’ networks of connections, help them coordi-
nate decisions with other government-controlled businesses, 
and cement their loyalty to the Party, as opposed to other 
constituencies such as shareholders or regions. 
To be sure, this is not completely different from what 
happens in other countries. American investment bank CEOs 
become treasury secretaries and bank regulators, Canadian tax 
auditors become corporate vice presidents; and the président 
et directeur général (PDG) of a French corporation is often a 
former civil servant from the ministry responsible for regulat-
ing that industry.64 
Indeed, there are remarkable parallels between Chinese 
and French corporate governance.65 In France, the 30 years 
of gloriously rapid post-war reconstruction from 1945 to 
monopsony rents from workers and savers.58 
If China has developed via a state-coordinated govern-
ment-financed Big Push, it is perhaps the first country ever 
to do so. Other state-led Big Push attempts, such as India’s 
post-independent Nehruvian-socialist plan for rapid devel-
opment and Nassar’s Arab-socialist plans for Egyptian 
industrialization, have in general fared even worse than Japan’s 
aborted state-run development strategy of the 1870s. Given 
the abundant examples of failed state-led Big Push efforts 
throughout the Third World, William Easterly, a leading 
development economist, laments “the stubborn survival of 
the legend of the big Push”—a legend that, “despite evidence 
of its failure, has continued to foster the planning approach 
to development.”59 
Why Chinese Corporate Governance Is Interesting
How, then, has China seemingly accomplished a state-led Big 
Push more or less precisely as Rosenstein-Rodan prescribed? 
Why did this work in China after it failed elsewhere? Is China 
exceptional? If so, how? 
We believe these are important research questions in 
Chinese corporate governance, and urge that more research 
be directed towards answering them.60 Corporate governance 
is ultimately about who manages the economy’s productive 
resources, what their incentives are, and how well all this 
works out for the economy at large. Although we don’t claim 
to be in a position to answer these questions, we can highlight 
a few aspects of Chinese corporate governance that may well 
be both unique to China and important contributors to its 
economic success.
State-coordinated Governance
Perhaps China’s state-led Big Push succeeded because its 
government officials are uniquely well selected and motivated. 
We consider two aspects of this potential uniqueness.
Corporate leaders’ incentives. First, does the Chinese 
system give its corporate leaders passably efficient incentives? 
One of the first things that strikes foreign observers when 
interacting with Chinese business executives is that corpo-
rate governance is not primarily a corporate matter. Chinese 
business corporations are not, for the most part, free-standing 
autonomous units insofar as governance is concerned. While 
they now have CEOs and boards with independent directors, 
these are not the totality of the governance mechanisms under 
which corporations function. 
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ing business activity of every kind.69 Business owners quickly 
found that investing in official connections generated a far 
higher return by easing these burdens than any investments 
in capital assets or technology. Development slowed and the 
Indian economy became a morass of regulation overgrowing 
increasingly antiquated and dilapidated physical assets. Such 
a situation can become a stable “equilibrium” that severely 
limits further growth.70 
Official corruption is, of course, widely recognized as 
an important problem in China too. But China’s growth 
has persisted despite these problems. Two characteristics of 
Chinese governments have been proposed to explain this. 
One explanation turns on the quasi-meritocratic nature 
of the CPC. This argument holds that many CPC cadres, 
especially at higher levels, are highly intelligent and competent 
technocrats, whose careers depend on demonstrable evidence 
of their facilitation of rapid growth in whatever firms, juris-
dictions, or industries they oversee. This combination of 
incentives and competence could limit government failure, 
and explain why China’s Big Push has worked to date. 
For example, a recent study of the governance of China’s 
banking system finds that top bank executives, government 
regulators, and party cadres in banks and regulatory agencies 
form a tight network,71 and argues that influence within this 
network correlates with ability. Because of this correlation, 
the system may be more socially productive than networks of 
entrenched cronies in many other developing countries.72 
Indeed, some do suggest have suggested that the entire 
Party hierarchy may well be substantially meritocratic, at 
least in important ways. Cadres reporting economic gains 
in the towns, cities, provinces, corporations, or industries 
they oversee tend to be promoted, as long as they also obey 
CPC policies and instructions.73 Both factors recall ancient 
Chinese traditions—examination-based rankings in the 
Imperial Civil Service and the Confucian virtue of obedi-
ence to superiors. They also suggest a surprising effectiveness 
of the CPC’s human resources management. 
It would be useful to know how meritocratic differ-
ent parts of the Chinese country and corporate governance 
systems actually are, and what other considerations affect 
cadres’ careers. Is merit more important in cadres’ promotions 
where the sorts of decisions they make have more economic 
importance, especially as regards coordinating growth? Is there 
regional variation? If so, does the system work better in places 
where cadres’ career moves are more clearly merit-based? 
These questions remaining unsettled, a degree of caution 
is warranted. An appearance of meritocracy may disguise 
tight networks of patronage and corruption. Or a genuine 
1975, dubbed les trente glorieuses, are associated with exten-
sive state intervention in corporate governance. While the 
role of the state has been now scaled back, many institutions 
of this era remain in place. Both government and business 
draw on the graduates of an elite set of schools, les grandes 
écoles. These admit students from throughout France solely 
on academic merit. Their graduates, called énarques after the 
École National d’Administration (ENA), arguably the grandest 
of the schools, follow a standard career path. CEOs typically 
begin in the civil service and later move to senior manage-
ment positions, often in the firms they previously regulated. 
Most French CEOs, senior corporate managers, and direc-
tors are énarques, as are most government top regulators and 
senior politicians.66 Whether because of this system or despite 
it, France achieved very high growth in these decades. We 
posit that France’s meaningfully meritocratic énarchie helped 
counter its trente glorieuses system’s obvious vulnerabilities to 
cronyism and entrenchment.67 
The virtue of such a system in China’s recent financial 
history may be its amenability to the centralized coordination 
necessary to effect a Big Push. At this point, research provides 
few answers and leaves many questions open. Does the rotation 
of CEOs and Party Secretaries through different firms and 
government and Party positions help coordinate Big Push 
growth? How does a CEO who exploited his firm’s monopoly 
or monopsony power to “hold up” another firm, behavior that 
Rosenstein-Rodan thought inevitable in an every-firm-for-
itself economy fare, in China? Is his career advanced because 
his hold-up play created value for his own firm’s shareholders; 
or does his failure to harmoniously facilitate overall economic 
growth instead land him in an isolated and unpleasant backwa-
ter for the next stage of his career? We do not know. 
Government leaders’ incentives. Alternatively, China’s 
uniqueness may follow from the incentives it sets before its 
government leaders. The failure of previous state-led Big Push 
efforts is attributed to pervasive government failure.68 This 
line of reasoning holds that the sweeping scale and intensity 
of state intervention associated with a state-led Big Push so 
greatly raise the returns to influencing government officials 
that political influence, rather than investment in produc-
tivity enhancement, becomes the most reliably profitable 
investment opportunity on offer. Thus, India’s attempt to 
implement a Big Push in its first decades after independence 
generated rapid growth for about a decade, and then collapsed 
into rampant political rent-seeking. The ensuing Licence 
Raj featured legions of ill-paid profit-maximizing bureau-
crats, each conveying approvals, permits, and licences to the 
highest bidders, thereby delaying, obstructing, or sabotag-
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No hypothesis has solid empirical validation, but all 
merit attention. We do not really know how meritocratic the 
Communist Party truly is. Nor do we know how the merito-
cratic element of Party governance varies across regions and 
over time, nor how this variation might affect the governance 
of banks, state-owned enterprises, and the many “private” 
corporations that are nonetheless deeply connected to various 
levels of government or to prominent Party or government 
officials. We do not know how aggressively Chinese city and 
regional governments compete, what they compete for, and 
how such competition might affect corporate governance. 
Hidden Virtues of Spontaneous Privatization?
Yet another possibility is that China’s success is not due to 
its government, and that Big Push coordination is actually 
led by an emerging private sector that features large business 
groups, rather like Japan’s zaibatsu and South Korea’s chaebol. 
An important phenomenon in 1990s in Eastern Europe 
and the former Soviet Union was spontaneous privatiza-
tion—the appropriation of nominally state-owned assets by 
politically connected insiders.77 This ranged from prominent 
Party cadres simply backing empty trucks up at state-owned 
enterprises’ loading docks to self-dealing in voucher privati-
zation programs. The result was the very rapid privatization 
of the most valuable state assets. This rapid privatization was 
justified by reformers as a necessary evil—better corrupt 
ex-communist business tycoons than bitter communist 
ex-apparatchiks plotting the restoration of Communism.78
Something akin to spontaneous privatization may 
have occurred on a major scale in China too. Structures of 
controlled listed firms reminiscent of Japanese zaibatsu and 
Korean chaebol appear to have formed, though controlled by 
state-owned enterprises rather than family firms.79 To the 
extent that meritorious princelings or other highly placed 
cadres now control these, a form of private ownership over 
business groups may be solidifying, or at least gelling.80 Thus, 
China’s cross-industry coordination, like that in Meiji Japan 
and South Korea, may actually be the work of corporate 
tycoons rather than communist central planners. 
The difference is that in China, in contrast to Japan or 
Korea, the business tycoons to whom development coordina-
tion decisions are delegated also happen to be connected to 
the Party. As in Meiji Japan, the Chinese government created 
state-owned enterprises and endowed many with imported 
technology. However, China’s mechanism for transferring 
control differs from Japan’s mass privatization, in which 
meritocracy at present might collapse into such a network 
over time. Or merit might be defined in socially suboptimal 
ways; for example, does accelerating a city’s contribution to 
overall GDP growth at the expense of environmental degra-
dation constitute genuine merit?74
Public Choice Theory A second category of explanations 
about why government failure is as yet in check in China 
turns on competition between different parts of the govern-
ment. Public choice theory posits that, under certain 
conditions, competition between governments for taxpay-
ers can induce the efficient provision of public goods.75 A 
jurisdiction that provides poor public goods and services for 
high taxes, or perhaps high side payments to officials, loses 
taxpayers to competing jurisdictions that provide value for 
tax money. These arguments are invoked to explain why, for 
example, taxpayers do not migrate from high-tax states such 
as Minnesota to low-tax states such as Alabama. Government 
services in Minnesota are posited as sufficiently superior to 
discourage emigration. 
China is a highly decentralized federation. Its city and 
provincial governments have substantially different track 
records. Some implemented market reforms rapidly and 
thoroughly; others delayed, hedged, and compromised. It 
quickly became apparent that those cities and provinces 
that freed markets more quickly and fully achieved greater 
prosperity. People and business activity fled laggard areas for 
the more dynamic market-oriented jurisdictions. This raises 
the possibility that Chinese governments are competing with 
each other to attract business activity and individuals with 
high human capital. 
This is plausible. Cadres’ running regional governments 
control budgets that depend on the earnings of the state-
owned enterprises that their governments control, on the 
revenues their governments earn from land leases, and on 
the tax revenues they manage to accrue. Such cadres therefore 
might desire to maximize the economic activity over which 
they preside so as to maximize the budgets they control. A 
city or province that provides poor public goods and services 
and makes doing business costly loses economic activity to 
other cities or provinces. This reduces the earnings of its state-
owned enterprises, the value of its land leases, and its tax 
revenues, leaving its senior cadres subject to tighter budget 
constraints.76
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without connections where GDP growth is underway and 
government cadres care more about growing their budgets 
and less about trading favors with cadres who run businesses. 
Here again, speculation has to be replaced by rigorous 
research. 
More generally, researchers might usefully contrast 
Chinese corporate governance with Japanese governance 
in the late 19th century, Korean governance in the 1970s 
to 1990s, or even French governance during that country’s 
postwar reconstruction, rather than present-day American 
norms. 
Is China Ready for Anglo-American Corporate  
Governance?
For centuries, foreign experts have patronizingly declared 
China “not ready” for democracy, freedom, capitalism, and 
other Western institutions. We are decidedly not taking this 
view. Rather, we raise the possibility that Anglo-American 
corporate governance is disadvantageous to any country 
undergoing very rapid development. This is because Anglo-
American corporate governance is explicitly about the 
governance of individual corporations: each firm’s manage-
ment is charged with maximizing the market value of its 
shares. During a Big Push, this could be a recipe for disaster. 
The recurring theme of Anglo-American corporate gover-
nance rules, regulation, and law is the maximization of firm 
value.83 Independent directors, non-executive chairs, exter-
nal auditors, and institutional investors are all contemplated 
as checks and balances that prevent self-interested CEOs or 
controlling shareholders from running their firms to maximize 
their personal utility rather than the wealth of their sharehold-
ers. Hostile takeovers and shareholder lawsuits are alternative 
mechanisms that can come into play if CEOs defeat these 
checks and balances. All of these alternative mechanisms of 
corporate governance make sense only on the implicit precon-
dition that social welfare is maximized when the value of every 
individual firm is independently maximized. 
Rosenstein-Rodan argues that this precondition is 
violated during a Big Push. When a Big Push is needed, 
product markets are typically “thin.” Yet, firms with market 
power must forswear exercising it to maximize their share 
valuations by holding up vulnerable firms. In short, social 
welfare optimization requires that corporations be governed 
together, or at least in very large groups. 
China has formally enacted corporate governance regula-
tions that are seemingly modelled on those of the United 
States, but drags its feet about their real implementation.84 
Thus, real questions arise about the actual power dynamics on 
Chinese boards, the information content of Chinese financial 
state-owned enterprises embodying imported technologies 
were auctioned off to private buyers. Still, the end result may 
be similar: the creation of seeds around which large diversi-
fied business groups can form. Once private ownership is in 
place, logic of the sort that motivated LG’s expansion in South 
Korea can guide the business group’s expansion along lines 
consistent with Big Push coordination—provided sufficient 
capital is available.
Capital in China is cheap and abundant for estab-
lished large firms, if not for entrants. China’s savings rate is 
extraordinarily high, and Chinese savers have few investment 
opportunities.81 They can either put their savings in state-
run banks or buy shares in listed firms, most of which are 
state-controlled, either directly or indirectly. The yuan is not 
a hard currency (it does not trade freely in foreign exchange 
markets), and Chinese savers cannot legally invest abroad, 
save through a handful of strictly limited investment funds. 
The large domestic demand for savings instruments, 
juxtaposed with their limited supply, keeps state-run banks’ 
interest payments low and makes equity sales by state-owned 
enterprises remunerative. This amounts to a kind of state-
sanctioned “oppression” of savers to keep the cost of capital 
low for SOEs and their insiders. Financial repression may well 
be defensible as a way of mitigating coordination problems 
that would otherwise curtail the flow of capital into diverse 
sectors of the economy. 
Research is needed to clarify how Chinese corporate 
governance contends with potential “hold up” problems, 
missing pieces of the network of necessary firms, and other 
coordination problems associated with operating in an 
economy under construction. One recent study reports that 
business groups are more vertically integrated in parts of 
China with weaker legal institutions, less advanced reforms, 
and more interventionist governments—and in cases where 
controlling owners are more politically connected. The study 
further reports that vertical integration in business groups 
without political connections correlates with per capita GDP 
growth, but vertical integration in business groups with 
political connections does not.82 One interpretation of these 
findings is that vertical integration can also be a coordination 
mechanism, and aimed at extracting monopoly rents is more 
common in less liberalized regions where insiders are more 
rapacious. But another is that vertical integration is more 
necessary where GDP growth remains low and free-market 
institutions are weaker, leaving centralized coordination of 
economic activity more important. Perhaps the difference 
in GDP growth associated with politically connected versus 
unconnected groups is evidence that political connections 
slow growth, or perhaps it means business groups can do 
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reinforce the carrot and stick system of the CPC, especially 
as it contributes to the economic growth that legitimizes its 
political monopoly. 
If Confucian values, by commending obedience to 
authority, are an advantage in mobilizing resources for a Big 
Push, they may be counterproductive in achieving full-fledged 
economic development. Big Push development is a “catch up” 
strategy, but a large and increasingly persuasive body of empir-
ical evidence suggests that innovation, especially by “creative 
destruction,” is the essential driver of economic growth for 
high-income economies. Innovation requires creativity and 
originality, not obedience. 
Another consideration is the fluidity of culture. Consider, 
for example, the recent rapid evolution of the concept of 
“marriage” in Christian cultures. Such change makes cultural 
variables questionable candidates for deep underlying expla-
nations. Confucianism in 1912 may well be as far from 
Confucianism in 2012 as Plymouth Rock Puritans are from 
their politically correct Congregationalist descendants. 
China’s rulers and people only a century ago were 
profoundly conservative and tradition-bound. The Dowager 
Empress Cixi allegedly forbade a railroad to Beijing for fear 
it would disturb the souls of her ancestors. She supported the 
Boxers, the Society of Righteous Fists, who tried to extermi-
nate all foreigners in China and believed themselves magically 
protected from bullets. 
Mao swept away all this pre-enlightenment magical think-
ing, if only to replace it with other forms of magical thinking, 
such as the belief that human nature might be changed by 
slogans and terror. Mao’s repeated failures left magical think-
ing discredited in the China of 1978, and pragmatism a sign of 
sophistication. Deng Xiaoping’s famous remark that “it doesn’t 
matter what color a cat is as long as it catches mice” was far 
more than a witticism. It was a reflection of the empiricism 
and rationalism that were now intellectually respectable. The 
Hu-Wen regime (2003-2013) explicitly advocated a “scientific 
development” approach. 
A 2002 study by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson shows 
that ex-colonies with more advanced indigenous institutions 
tend to fare worse after independence. The authors’ explana-
tion focuses on the durability of such pre-colonial institutions 
that, because designed to stabilize extractive economies run for 
the benefit of small elites, first pre-colonial and then colonial, 
end up providing greater barriers to broad-based develop-
ment. This explanation might be used to suggest that Mao, 
by crushing traditional Chinese institutions, also succeeded 
in obliterating any cultural barrier to development in China. 
If so, research focusing on differences in the persistence of 
traditional values in different parts of China, or different 
segments of society, might be useful. Is development slower 
where traditional values are more durable? 
statements, the economic purpose of mergers, and the sorts of 
pressures institutional investors should be exerting. To many 
observers, China appears to be adopting the form, but not the 
substance, of American corporate governance. Champions of 
the Anglo-American model find this deplorable; but if that 
model fails to fit China’s current economic realities, this lack 
of substance is understandable. 
Is Chinese Culture Economically Exceptional
Obviously China is culturally exceptional, but does Chinese 
culture, or its deep institutional or historical features more 
generally, contribute to its rapid growth? Whenever China 
does poorly, allegations about the intrinsic hostility of Chinese 
culture to development draw attention. Now that China is 
doing comparatively well, Chinese culture is lauded as an 
obvious advantage. 
Thus, a recent study finds that people’s willingness to trust 
other people in general correlates with national economies’ 
ability to sustain large organizations, such as big businesses.85 
China ranks near the top, alongside Finland and Denmark, 
in this kind of trust and near the bottom, again alongside the 
Scandinavian countries, in adherence to hierarchical religions. 
The study designates Roman Catholic Christianity and Islam 
“hierarchical” and Confucianism as non-hierarchical.
This judgment call jars somewhat with earlier explanations 
of how Confucius’ teachings limit economic development. 
Consider, for example, the following assessment by L.Y. Ho, 
a frustrated Chinese reformer in 1912, of how Confucianism’s 
obsession with hierarchy keeps China backward: 
Confucianism advocates the superiority of antiquity. From 
that follows the corollary: “Love thy parents and reverence the 
Emperor.” As the Emperor is the head of heads, loyalty to the 
Emperor precedes filial devotion to parents. The Emperor being 
absolute over his subjects as the father over his children, it became 
his interest to inculcate unquestioning obedience in his subjects. 
According to the old conception of government, the best way of 
bringing this about was ignorance.86
Perhaps traditional Chinese values are more amenable to 
rapid development than Ho allows. A Big Push requires coordi-
nation from above—if not from the state or Party, then from a 
controlling tycoon. Confucius’ teachings sanctifying obedience 
to authority might be a positive advantage in limiting agency 
problems associated with a Big Push. More deferential execu-
tives at lower levels throughout a business group might, for 
example, be more likely to obey commands from above and 
thus better act in concert for the good of the business group 
or the whole economy. If so, the restoration of Confucian 
values underway at present in the People’s Republic may be 
an important energizer of growth. Confucian values may well 
85. La Porta et al. (1997). 86. Ho (1912, p. 4).
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necessitates broader availability of a drug. The American 
government overrode the Wright brothers’ patent on the 
airplane so the American military could arm faster in World 
War I. 
China’s political discretionary options are different, 
however. The corporate governance of every business of any 
importance operates subject to options to veto held by an 
invisible boss. Any decision, contract, or property right can 
be overridden should the invisible boss exercise an option. 
Corporate decision-making must thus proceed with the 
mixed objectives of maximizing firm value subject to the 
constraints these options imply. The CPC’s overriding author-
ity, which most likely reflects decisions made by the Upper 
Standing Committee or Politburo, may indeed be instru-
mental to the successful central coordination of a Big Push. 
But these ubiquitous discretionary options also guarantee 
senior cadres’ paramount power, influence, and policy flexi-
bility, and are perks that are doubtless hard to surrender. We 
worry that these options are sowing seeds of corruption, and 
hindering the development of the sound firm-level corporate 
governance that will be needed in an innovation-driven ascent 
to high-income status.
Every present-day high-income country once traversed 
a similar path. Western European absolute monarchs and 
North American colonial governors once stood above the 
law, but were humbled by rebellions and revolutions in some 
countries and by largely peaceable reforms in others, though 
fear of revolution may have played a role everywhere.88 Absolute 
rulers first accepted the interference of councils of barons, then 
unelected legislative councils, and finally freely elected parlia-
ments. They accepted reforms that denied them the powers 
to appoint and dismiss judges and civil servants, and that 
ultimately subjected them to the same laws that commoners 
had to obey. No country, save a handful of small petro-states, 
has ever attained and sustained high-income status without 
this transition. Perhaps China is different, but we are inclined 
to doubt it. 
 Our greatest concern is that China could be caught in 
a middle-income trap. Could China, in the long run, settle 
down to become a giant Peru? An oligarchic elite—de facto 
if not de jure permanently above the law—may persist in 
control of both the state and the economy. That elite may 
fear the microeconomic instability associated with growth 
through creative destruction, and seek to preserve their power 
to coordinate the economy in the name of a stability that 
incidentally preserves a political, economic, and social status 
quo advantageous to its members.89 There will be no short-
age of justifications for slowing or pausing development: the 
loss of jobs in old firms that results from creative destruction 
However, the successes of Korea, Japan, and Taiwan 
as well as those of Hong Kong and Singapore constitute a 
problem for this explanation. China and its very economically 
successful neighbours have traditional cultural values derived 
largely from the same historical roots. If Mao’s destruction 
of traditional values cleared the way for development, how 
did China’s neighbors manage their earlier rapid industrial-
izations? Meiji Japan plausibly remade Japanese institutions 
profoundly, but the other newly developed countries of the 
Sino-sphere continued to revere their traditions. 
Although the idea seems counterintuitive, there is now 
abundant evidence suggesting that the instability associated 
with creative upstart firms continually arising to destroy 
established firms actually has a stabilizing effect on the 
economy as a whole by sustaining a broad-based prosperity 
that leaves social problems more tractable than in a stagnant 
economy.87 How to spark creativity in a society that venerates 
hierarchy has become a major policy question in both Japan 
and Korea. Even if deepening Confucian values help China 
affect its Big Push, it seems likely that further development 
would favor cultural evolution towards a more American 
acceptance of brash upstarts who overthrow established ways 
of doing things. 
 
Habit Formation and Governance Options
Even if China’s current emulation of American corporate 
governance amounts to little more than “going through the 
motions,” cognitive dissonance can turn habits into values. 
CEOs who ritually turn to boards for approval may come 
to need that approval if it is someday withheld. Directors, 
basking in the social status that position provides, may some-
day find media or shareholder criticism of their decisions so 
disturbing that they reassess CEOs’ decisions to avoid it. 
The critical reason why Chinese corporate governance 
remains, to a large part at least, show rather than substance 
is the fundamental constitutionally entrenched position of 
the CPC above the law. Every rule, regulation, law, and court 
decision is subject to the approval of the CPC. This effectively 
gives the Communist Party options to amend any business 
contract, regulatory decree, or court judgment in the interests 
of the Proletariat. Chinese corporate governance must take 
these ubiquitous official discretionary options as given. Some 
of the arguments above even allow that these options have 
a constructive function in coordinating economic activity. 
Official discretionary options are not uniquely Chinese. 
American firms buy property that can be taken by eminent 
domain, and American courts can amend business contracts 
that run counter to public policy. Patents can be limited if a 
pressing social problem—a disease like AIDS, for example—
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level planning. Once real decisions are made at the firm 
level—and without oversight or central guidance—corpo-
rate governance will become central to how China allocates 
capital, labor, and resources. Investors’ expectations about 
how firms are governed will determine the cost of capital 
for entrepreneurs setting up new firms, and thus the pace 
of creative destruction. Experience in going through the 
motions may make this transition easier.  
China’s reforms since 1978 have been experimental 
and gradual. An officially sanctioned metaphor is “feeling 
the stones to cross the river.” One interpretation of China’s 
current policy of emulating the form, if not the substance, 
of U.S. corporate governance, financial regulation, and so on 
is that this amounts to feeling for a stone that may someday 
carry the country’s full economic weight. If so, China’s most 
senior cadres are contemplating passing the responsibility for 
coordinating the economy to market forces and the respon-
sibility for responding to those forces to the top executives 
of individual firms. 
China’s emulation of developed economies’ institu-
tions probably makes sense. Missing institutions can be 
worked aroundwork in a small country, whose residents can 
“borrow” foreign institutions. For example, a small European 
country might do perfectly well without an active stock 
market because its more entrepreneurial residents can list 
their firms in London or Amsterdam. However, an economy 
of China’s size probably needs a full spectrum of domestic 
institutions that are oriented toward and capable of sustain-
ing the prosperity of its people. 
At present, the greatest challenge confronting China’s 
reformers may well be subjecting its elite—senior cadres in 
control, “princelings,” and other vested interests—to the 
rule of law. This is difficult because it runs counter to the 
constitutionally enshrined Leading Role granted the Party. 
But all other high-income countries, excepting a few petro-
states, did likewise, and in the process rethought equally 
cherished traditions—for example, the necessity of an 
absolute monarch for keeping the peace.91
 Perhaps such changes might come about as China 
searches for ways to address its problem of inequality. While 
inequities such as the “hukou” system92 attract increasing 
attention, the widest inequality is that between the CPC elite 
and everyone else. Although their official monetary incomes 
were not high under Mao, this elite occupied the Command-
ing Heights of the economy. Many of their descendants, 
China’s “princelings,” lead lives of great privilege and may be 
emerging in positions of power throughout the economy and 
government.93 While intelligence is arguably partially inher-
often precedes the growth in employment associated with 
the rise of new firms, creating unemployment and political 
pressure to bail out the old firms or constrain new competi-
tors.90 In addition to slowing creative destruction, bailouts 
can lead to financial crises as the debts of old firms become 
sovereign debts. China’s current crop of SOEs, whether their 
privatization is completed or not, would likely be destroyed 
quickly should creative destruction commence in earnest. 
Would this be allowed? Or would ever-rising bailouts trigger 
a Chinese financial crisis? Or could an altruistic and vision-
ary leadership lead China peacefully past the middle-income 
trap?
Conclusions 
China may indeed be exceptional. Its meritocratic predispo-
sitions, its people’s willingness to obey a legitimate hierarchy, 
and its very real reforms that reoriented its multiple levels 
of government towards enhancing economic growth have 
worked well to date. China has gone far towards accom-
plishing a Big Push—the all-embracing transition from 
subsistence agriculture to an industrial economy. That tran-
sition is a necessary first step on the path to sustainably 
high-incomes for all Chinese. 
But Big Push coordination is only the first step. The 
corporate governance institutions appropriate to overcoming 
the coordination problems intrinsic to early-stage develop-
ment are apt to work ever less well as development continues. 
As Hayek and many of his followers have argued, even in 
economies with minimal amounts of corruption, informa-
tion and coordination problems tend to grow rapidly as an 
economy develops, and central planners are almost certain 
to become overwhelmed by allocation tasks that markets 
have been shown to solve well. And China is not without 
corruption. Private-sector business groups might already be 
better positioned to advance growth than state-run groups, 
but at some point business groups in general will outlive their 
usefulness. Once all the components of a modern economy 
are in place, decision-making is better removed to the level of 
individual privately owned companies, where market forces 
are most keenly felt. At that point, institutions resembling 
those in existing high-income countries seem necessary if 
China’s rise is to continue, even if this discommodes its elite. 
When that time arrives, China may benefit from 
business leaders, investors, bankers, and regulators accus-
tomed to going through the motions of an Anglo-American 
system of corporate governance. The show of Western 
governance institutions might gain substance if China 
successfully transitions to market-driven decentralized firm-
91. See Fukuyama (2011).
92. China inherited a legacy of real inequality from early Communist reforms that 
assigned everyone a hereditary “hukou” (household registration) designation. This binds 
people to specific localities, and civil privileges vary substantially by location, and thus 
by “hukou.” Because post-1978 economic development centered on cities, particularly 
coastal cities, the gap of economic opportunities between rural and urban location, and 
even between rich and poor cities, has widened considerably. See Freeman (2014) for 
details. 
93. See, e.g, Bloomberg News Dec. 26th 2012 at www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-
12-26/immortals-beget-china-capitalism-from-citic-to-godfather-of-golf.html. 
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cannot pass a law that it cannot repeal—but the British 
muddle through. The Canadian constitution preserves the 
supremacy of its parliament by letting parliament enact a law 
“notwithstanding” the fact that the law itself is unconstitu-
tional. By delineating a process through which this must be 
done, the constitution ensures that it almost never happens, 
but ancient traditions are preserved. The United States explic-
itly gives different parts of it government power over each 
other with the goal of creating a system of checks and balances.
 Perhaps China could employ some similar léger de main: 
for example, the Party might be allowed to force a measure 
“notwithstanding” its being illegal—but only under specific 
circumstances and by using a specific procedure.96 Or China 
might make its courts entirely independent of Party oversight 
to create a system of checks and balances. The histories of 
today’s high-income countries provide a number of options, 
and legal scholars could no doubt produce more. 
However, the economic histories of all large high-income 
countries have much in common. Perhaps most importantly, 
all found ways to subject their government to the rule of 
law.97 This was essential, for unlimited governments cannot 
make credible commitments to enforce business contracts or 
safeguard investors. All passed through periods of laissez-faire 
limited government, when stock markets financed new large 
firms, when the penalty for falling behind was bankruptcy, 
and when growth rates far exceeded historical norms.98 This 
includes currently bank-centered economies, such as Germany 
and Japan, whose initial industrializations were largely stock 
market financed.99 All found ways to press the managers of 
individual firms to align good governance, at least roughly, 
with economic efficiency and successful innovation.100 The 
precise mechanisms differ somewhat across high income 
countries, with different roles for institutional investors, 
shareholder lawsuits, boards of directors, corporate takeovers, 
foreign investors, banks, employees, product market compe-
tition, and other factors. But the differences are minor 
compared to the difference between China now and any of 
the major high-income countries. 
China’s easier path is to emulate successful Western 
country and corporate governance more faithfully, as Japan, 
Korea, and Taiwan have. This done, state-owned enter-
prises could be fully privatized, Party Secretaries and Party 
Committees could fade away, and the financial system could 
turn to financing creative new firms of the sort that power 
creative destruction. The government could then specialize 
in the core competencies of government—public education, 
health care, and disinterested justice. This obviously neces-
sitates rethinking the Party’s role. 
ited, their prominence begs uncomfortable questions about 
the sustainability of a meritocratic character in the CPC. 94 
Another potential vested interest is people who succeeded 
in the current system based on merit, and who might well be 
top performers in any management or government system. 
They contributed greatly to China’s decades of reform and 
earned commensurate privileges, which spill over to their 
children, relatives, and associates. They too could become 
oligarchs. 
Will descendants of heroes of the decades of reform, like 
those of heroes of the Long march, the Liberation, and the 
decades of communism, become a nascent network of heredi-
tary oligarchs, whether consciously or not, working to lock in 
their privileges regardless of the social costs to the country? 
China currently depends on cheap labor and finan-
cial repression, and so is essentially an extractive economy, 
and therefore subject to what Daron Acemoglu and James 
Robinson, in their 2012 book Why Nations Fail: The Origins 
of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty, call the iron law of oligarchy, 
mutually reinforcing political and economic institutions that 
lock in high inequality and slow growth.95 In their 2004 book, 
Saving Capitalism from the Capitalists, Raghuram Rajan and 
Luigi Zingales provide a compelling account of mid-20th 
century “great reversals” in the financial development of many 
countries. They show that, in a remarkable number of econo-
mies, after an initial period of rapid development, an aging 
cohort of business leaders and their heirs work to undermine 
their countries’ financial system to deny capital to potential 
entrants, their would-be competitors. This entrusts corpo-
rate governance to decreasingly talented and more entrenched 
generations of old-moneyed business families. Is China build-
ing an enduringly strong financial system that will continue 
capitalizing new firms into the distant future? Or are its 
banks and stock markets simply mechanisms for capitalizing 
an initial set of businesses and providing the well-connected 
with family wealth proportionate to their political influence? 
Or, most fundamentally, will vested interest benefiting from 
the present unbalanced access to capital resist, or even reverse, 
liberalization?
Perhaps measures that subject individual cadres and their 
relatives to the rule of law, while preserving the status of 
the Party as an institution, could prove politically viable as 
reforms aimed at enhancing equality. Such reforms would be 
reminiscent of how other countries solved similar problems. 
For example, Britain preserved the legal supremacy of its 
parliament, but subjects all individual members of parlia-
ment, including the prime minister, to the rule of law. The 
situation contains contradictions—for example, parliament 
94. On Chinese “princelings,” see Brown (2014). 
95. See Acemoglu and Robinson (2012).
96. For example, as discussed in the article in this issue by Paul Gillis, the proposed 
IPO of Alibaba amounts to a direct violation of the spirit (if not the letter) of Chinese law, 
which restricts ownership of businesses in certain enterprises to Chinese citizens or in-
stitutions. 
97. See Fukuyama 2005
98. Morck and Steir (2005).
99. For the case of Germany, see Fohlin (2005) and for Japan, see Morck and Naka-
mura (2005).
100. See Roe (1996, 2003); La Porta et al. (1999).
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